ESA 11/2

31
MARIAN STAMP DAWKINS J ANIMAL
SUFFERINr: THE SCIENCE OF ANIMAL
WELF,R
LONDON: CHAPMAN AND HALL
LTD.DISTRIBUTEP IN THE UNITED
STATES BY METHUEN) 19~OJ 14~ PP.

t

£7.50, $19.95 (Hardback) £3.95, $9.95
(Paperback) •

If you know that practices like factory
farming are cruel, and don't want to be
bothered with the evidence, you won't be
interested in this book; on the other
hand, if you want to be able to argue
with hard-headed scientists and agri
culturalists who demand evidence for
claims that chickens suffer when con
fined in battery cages, don't hesitate:
order your copy of Animal Suffering
today.
When the book comes, it may not be quite
what you expect. It is not a crusading
polemic against the now-familiar targets
of factory farming, experimentation
and hunting. Nor is it a philosophical
argument about animals and ethics;
Instead it is something quite new:
a sober, scientific investigation
into ways in which we can assess
whether an animal is suffering. The
only book at all like it that has
appeared in recent years is Donald
Griffin's The Question of Animal Awareness
(New York, 1976), but where Griffin
limited himself to the modest ai~ of
persuading scientists to take account of
the fact that animals other than humans
may be conscious, Dawkins tackles the
bolder task of detecting suffering.
Thus Dawkins' aim is not to argue that
battery cages, for example, do or do
not cause suffering to hens. She is
interested rather in how we can set
about to answer such a question. Should
we accept the views of the farmers who
say that the hens must be happy, because
otherwise the farm wouldn't be profitable?
Or should we be satisfied with thinking
about how we would hate to be cooped ~p
in a small cage all day? Dawkins'
says that neither of these approaches
will do, and there is a need for some
thing better.

Those who lobby in defense of factory
farming often argue that productivity
is the only 'scientific' measure of
animal welfare. They seek to portray
their animal liberationist opponents
as emotional, unscientific sentimentalists
who commit the notorious fallacy of anthro
pomorphism. Of course, this kind of argu
ment finds willing ears among those who
don't feel inclined to alter their diet
in order to avoid factory farm produce.
Perhaps the chief significance of Dawkins'
book, therefore, is that she believes
there can be scientific and objective
ways of assessing animal welfare which
are not based on productivity. More
over she sets out in some detail the
ways in which this can be done.
The methods of assessing welfare that
Dawkins discusses are--in addition to
'productivity'--observations of the
animal's physical health, study of the
degree to which its living conditions
are unnatural, physiological obser
vations of hormone changes associated
with stress, observation of behavior,
especially abnormal or stereotypic
behavior, analogies with ourselves,
and tests in -which animals are allowed
to choose for themselves. In each
case she sets out the difficulties
that lie in the way of getting an insight
into the subjective experiences of
another creature, but she also makes
it clear that these difficulties
are not in principle insuperable. While
no method is adequate on its own, a
combination of several methods can
give us a good indication of whether
an animal is suffering.
Of these methods the most interesting is
the method that allows the animal to
choose for itself. Dawkins' own work
has been in this area, She has, for
example, placed hens in the middle of
a corridor, one end of which leads to
a battery cage and the other to an open
run, Even when the birds have been
raised in a cage environment and have
never seen an open run, they need only
a few minutes exposure to it before
they will choose it consistently over
the cage,
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times it can even provide evidence
for rejecting the opinions of careful
observers. A striking instance of
this was a test of the recommendation
of the British Government's Brambell
Committee that fine gauge wire mesh
should not be used for the floor of
battery cages. The Committee thought
that the birds were more comfortable
on a heavier metal mesh. In fact,
when given a choice, hens spend much
more time on the finer wire. so
presumably they prefer it.
The possibilities of this method are
imagilimited only by the bounds of our imagi
nation in devising ways of letting
animals choose. Pigs can be trained
to adjust lighting and heating with
their snouts; in this way they tell
us that they don't like the semi
semiintendarkness that prevails in many inten
sive farms. As Dawkins says:
Animals may not be able to
talk, but they can vote with
their feet and express some
of what they are feeling by
where they choose to go.
If they were to be provided
with the right electronic
gadgetry, who knows what
they could tell us, by
voting with their snouts
or their paws or their
beaks?
(In Animal Liberation I said that
since animals can't vote, it is meanmean
ingless to talk of their right to vote.
Perhaps I was too hasty.)
In addition to being a careful scientist
and a lucid writer of jargon-free
prose (already an unusual combination)
Dawkins reveals a breadth of underunder
standing rare in scientists working
in animal behavior. In addition to
the obviously relevant books like
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1974). II found
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only
only one
one point
point to
to criticise:
criticise: she
she is
is
unfair to Richard Ryder when she
asserts (on p. 3) that he claimed that
two-thirds of all experiments in Britain
are for non-medical purposes (a claim
which she then shows to be erroneous).
In fact what Ryder actuahly said was
that less than a third of experiments
'can be seen to be medical.' He was
making no claim as to the actual
figures but a point about what can
be seen by the statistics provided by
the government.
All in all. though, a splendid book which
may well prove to be the foundation
stone of a new science of animal welfare.
Peter Singer
Monash University

